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FIRGINIA SECTION 
THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW 
CONTRACTS AND SALES 
Joseph Curtis• 
Co::o<TRACTS 
!\' o W ah;er by Silence 
Silence is not golden \vhen there is a duty to speak, but the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals found no duty when an owner permitted a 
builder to complete a late performance but did not state that he would 
seek damages for the delay. In May v. Martin/ the builder took approxi-
mately twenty months to complete construction of two houses; there was 
evidence that they could reasonably have been completed in four months. 
'When sued by the builder for the balance of the building contract price, 
the owner counterclaimed for the additional sixteen months' interest that 
he had had to pay on money borrowed to construct the houses. The jury 
returned a verdict which denied the owner offset of these damages, but the 
Court of Appeals found fault with two of the instructions that had been 
given by the lower court. The first was that the builder should not be 
held respor1sible if the jury should find that the owner had failed to take 
reasonable steps to minimize the damage from the builder's delay. The 
Court could find no evidence of the owner's failure ·in this respect to 
warrant giving this instruction.2 The second was that if the jury should 
find that the owner had acquiesced in the delay, the builder would not be 
liable for the additional interest expense incurred by the owner. This the 
Court held to be an incorrect statement of the law, as it gave to acquies-
cence the "same weight, meaning, and implication as waiver." The Court 
stated that the owner could either treat the delay as a breach and declare 
the contracts forfeited, or permit the delay and claim damages therefor, 
"Dean and Professor of Jurisprudence, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of 
William and Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New York University. 
I. 205 Va. 397, 137 S.E. 2d 860 (1964). 
2. \Vhere there is no evidence that could support an affirmative finding by the jury 
on a matter, an instruction which permits them to speculate on it, although correctly 
'itating the law involved, is generally held to be reversible error. See Foreman v. E. Cali-
gari & Co., 204 Va. 284, 130 S.E.2d 447 (1963). 
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without any duty to advise the builder of election of the latter course.3 
The case was remanded, however, for a jury's determination of the time 
within which the work was to be performed since there was conflicting 
evidence on that point. 
Tendency to Imply Terms to Avoid Uncertainty and Indefiniteness 
In High Knob, Inc. v. Allen4 written sales contracts and deeds to resi-
dential properties made no reference as to how the vendees were to obtain 
water, but did proscribe the taking of water from the ground through 
development of wells or springs. Faced with this impasse, the chancellor 
had permitted the introduction by the vendees of an oral agreement where-
by the vendor's water system was to be made available as the source of 
water for their properties. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the 
chancellor's holding that the written contracts did not encompass the 
entire understanding of the parties and obviously implied that there must 
have been some other agreement on this point, admissible by parol under 
the doctrines of partial integration and collateral contract. But even the 
oral agreements introduced by the vendees failed to specify the length of 
time that the vendor would be obligated to supply water. The chancellor 
was not at all reluctant to find by implication that the term was for so 
long as the vendor's water system was capable of supplying a reasonable 
quantity of water and that therefore the oral agreements were not void for 
indefiniteness and uncertainty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stressed 
the tendency of the courts to tum away from a conscruction which would 
render a contract void on these brounds, especially where there has been 
partial performance as in the instant case. 
Since it was not raised below, the Court refused to treat the point that 
the oral agreements were barred by the statute of frauds as not to be per-
formed within one year. However, since the implied term was for "so 
long as the vendor's water system was capable of supplying a reasonable 
quantity of water," the matter should fall in that category where the ter-
minating event might possibly happen within a year, however unlikely it 
is to do so, and thus it would not be within the scope of the statute. 
Independent Collateral Agreement Not Ban·ed by Pm·ol Evidence Rule 
Additional exposition on the parol evidence rule was given by the 
3. Contentions of waiver by silence have sometimes succeeded in insurance cases, see 
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, 215 Ill. 299, 74 N.E. 141 (1905), but the vie·w that there is 
no duty to speak more often prevails, see Oriole Paper Box Co. ,., Reliance Ins. Co .. 
257 F. 2d 707 (4th Cir. 1958). Of course, silence when coupled with other circum-
stances may give rise to an estoppel. 
4. 205 Va. 503, 138 S.E. 2d 49 (1964). 
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Supreme Court of Appeals in Durham v. National Pool Equipment Co.o 
In this case two written contracts had been entered into by the parties, one 
for the supply of equipment for the construction of a swimming pool,6 
and the other for the furnishing of technical advice by the equipment seller. 
Plaintiff-vendee sought to establish the vendor's oral "guarantee" that the 
total cost of the pool would be no more than 8,000 dollars and plaintiff's 
action was to recover the excess of approximately 5,000 dollars which he 
had expended. The two written contracts fixed the costs of the equipment 
and technical advice, making no mention of such "guarantee," and the 
lower court struck plaintiff's evidence and entered summary judgment for 
the defendant-seller. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's 
evidence tended to establish an indemnification agreement, independent of 
and in addition to the written terms, since the subject matter of the written 
contracts was confined only to the costs of the equipment and the technical 
advice and did not encompass the actual construction of the pool and 
total cost thereof. This independent collateral agreement, said the Court, 
would not vary or contradict in any )vay the terms of the written con-
tracts, and hence was not barred by the parol evidence rule.7 The case was 
remanded, however, for the determination of the sufficiency of plaintiff's 
total evidence to establish the oral agreement, since his oral testimony 
was stricken before he had rested his case and the probative value of the 
oral testimony alone was at least questionable for that purpose. 
Promisee Need Not Assist Promisor's Performance 
It is an implied condition of every contract that one party will not 
hinder or prevent performance by the other.8 This is. not, however, ex-
tended to the point of obligating the one to facilitate or assist the other's 
performance, except in circumstances from which it may be inferred that 
the promisee is unqcr a duty to cooperate. In Whitt v. Godwin,fJ the 
written promise to pay a sum of money to the promisee for a stated con-
sideration was absolute in form, although there was evidence that the 
promisee knew that the promisor hoped to obtain the money with which 
to make payment from a third party who was demanding that both pro-
misor and promisee join in a release discharging the third party from a 
5. 205 Va.441, 138 S.E. 2d 55 (1964). 
6. Although this contract had not been formally executed by the defendant, the 
Court found assent from the acts and conduct of the parries. 
7. However, what was the consideration for the indemnification promise, if not the 
price to be paid for the equipment and technical advice? Or was it the assent to enter 
into the equipment and technical service contracts? If the latter, is not the issue one of 
proving fraud in the inducement rather than a collateral contract? 
8. 5 WILUSToN, CoNTRACTS§ 677A (3d ed. 1961). 
9. 205 Va. 797. 139 S.F. 2d 841 (1965). 
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certain liability. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's 
holding that the refusal of the promisee to execute the release was no defense 
to the promisee's action against the promisor. The result reached was 
reinforced by the fact that the promisee had stated at the time of the 
execution of the agreement with the promisor that he would not be willing 
to sign the release, and the promisor nevertheless had made his promise 
absolute and not expressly conditioned upon the promisee's joining in the 
release. 
Applicability of the parol evidence rule also entered into the issue 
before the Supreme Court, which said that the rule is not one of evidence 
but of substantive law, and that therefore although parol evidence may have 
been admitted without objection, a court may disregard it upon a sub-
sequent motion for summary judgment.10 
D.mzages for Willful Defects Without Fraud 
A contractor's suit to enforce a mechanic's lien in the amount of the 
unpaid contract price was met by the owner's counterclaim for defective 
work.11 The owner prevailed on his counterclaim and was given judgment 
for the full amount of the damages without offset of the unpaid contract 
price. The Supreme Court of Appeals could find no justification for this 
result on the grounds that the contractor's departures were made knowingly 
and willfully, but without fraud. The Court distinguished the "no re-
covery for intentional departure" cases from those in which the contractor 
and owner asserted offsetting cbims and from those where the departures 
did not involve bad faith. The Court noted that disallowance of the offset 
for the unpaid contract price would in this case place the owner in a 
better position than if the contract had been wholly performed in ac-
cordance with its terms, and subject the contractor to punitive measures 
despite the lack of any bad faith. . 
The major part of the Court's opinion in this case was concerned with 
an interesting, but not novel, agency issue-whether an architect who is 
to have general supervision of the work has authority to bind the owner 
by approval of substantial changes in the specifications. It is generally held 
that the architect's supervisory authority does not constitute him a general 
agent of the owner for all purposes.12 The Court's adherence to the general 
rule was facilitated by specific terms of the contract between the owner . 
and the contractor which expressly limited the architect's authority to 
approve changes. in the work. 
10. See Laughlin, Evidence, 1964-196) Anm1al Survey of Va. La·w, 51 VA. L. REv. 
& n.i (1965). 
II. Kirk Reid Co. v. Fine, 205 Va. 778, 139 S.E. 2d 829 (1965). 
12. 5 AM. JuR. 2o Arcbitects § 6, at 668 (1962). 
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No Estoppel Against State Acting in Governmental Capacity 
Another case in which reliance upon the authority of subordinate em-
ployees to approve substantial changes was found to be misplaced is Main v. 
Department of High-u•aysP As in Kirk Reid Co. 7..'. Fine,14 the contract ex-
pressly provided the method for authorizing substantial changes in the 
highway construction specifications, and the contractor's failure to adhere 
proved fatal to his right to recover for extra work. Resort to an estoppel 
contention was met with the holding that the doctrine does not apply to 
the rights of a state when acting in its sovereign or go\·emmental capacity. 
The Court also passed upon the validity of an arbitration provision in the 
contract, holding that it was enforceable as an implied condition precedent 
to the right of action. 
Tenninability of Exclusive Agency Agreement To Procure a Purchaser 
Distinguishing clauses in exclusive listing agreements requiring "efforts 
to find a purchaser" and "making r~asonable efforts to sell" from one 
\l.:hich required "procuring a purchaser and advertising therefor," the 
Supreme Court of Appeals held that in the latter instance there is only 
an offer by the owner which is terminable in good faith at any time prior 
to acceptance effected by the agent's producing someone ready, willing 
and able to buy on the stated terms of sale. In Hummer v. Engeman,tr, the 
agent's prospective purchaser was willing to meet the scheduled payments 
upon commensurate piecemeal release of the land, which counteroffer was 
not acceptable to the owner. Reversing the lower court judgment for the 
agent, the Court held that the owner's termination of the agency and 
subsequent sale to another within the thirty-day perio.d set forth in the 
agreement for the duration of the exciusive agency did not subject the 
mvner to liability for payment of a commission to the agent. 
Where the consideration to be given by the agent is recited to be his 
efforts, there, too, in the absence of an agency coupled with an interest, 
the agreement is unilateral. Acceptance is effected by the agent's making 
substantial efforts, whereupon the owner becomes bound for the duration 
of the agency agreement.16 The significance of the distinction lies not 
in the unilateral or bilateral nature of the agreement, but in the performance 
required to effectuate the agent's acceptance. 
13. 206 Va. 143, 142 S.E. 2d 524 (1965). 
14. 205 Va. 778, 139 S.E.2d 829 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 11 & 1:! 
supra. 
15. 206 Va. 102, 141 S.E.2d 716 (1965). 
16. See 1\lorris v. Bragg, 155 Va. 912, 156 S.E. 381 (1931); Wilson v. Brown, 136 Va. 
634, 118 S.E. 88 (1923). Both cases are mentioned by the Court in the principal case 
as exemplifying the distinction in consequences depending upon the nature of the per-
formance required of the agent. 
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Anticipatory Breach Eliminates Tender Requirement 
Optionee timely notified optionor that it elected to exercise its option 
to purchase the subject property and proffered a contract to purchase 
which it contended was wholly in conformance with the sale terms set 
forth in the agreement. Optionor refused to execute the tendered con-
tract, there being a difference of opinion as to whether a major provision 
thereof was in accord with the option agreement. Optionee brought suit 
for specific performance in advance of the date set forth for final perform-
ance and without tendering the purchase price or entering into further 
negotiations to arrive at contract terms suitable to the optionor. The 
factual question whether optionee's proposed contract embodied the option 
terms was resolved in its favor and in Two-Way Tronics, Inc. v. Greater 
lVashington Educational Television Ass'n11 the Supreme Court of Appeals 
affirmed the holding of the lower court that optionor's refusal to execute 
the contract preferred by optionee constituted an anticipatory breach. 
This, the Court held, permitted suit in advance of the performance date 
and eliminated the requirement of tender of the purchase price by the 
vendee as well as any alleged requirement that the vendee enter into 
further negotiations to obtain the vendor's acceptance of terms. These 
would seem to be the well-recognized consequences of an anticipatory 
breach. 
True Ow11er's Chain of Title St,·ouger Th.m Tbiefs 
There are few exceptions to the general rule that a thief cannot convey 
a title superior to that of the true owner, even to one who pays full value 
and in good faith. One of the exceptions pertains to the negotiation of 
stolen documents of title under some of the uniform acts;18 another is in the 
transfer of a vehicle in strict certificate of title jurisdictions.19 Virginia 
has certificate of title laws,:w but does not align herself with those states 
which treat the title certificate as conclusive of interest,21 and in Vicars v. 
Atlamic Discount Co.22 the certificate of title holder, whose chain of title 
went back to a thief, was compelled to surrender possession of a car to the 
17. 206 Va. llO. 141 S.E.2d 742 (1965). 
18. See, e.g., UNIFORM CoMMERCHL ConE § 7-502(2); VA. ConE ANN. § 8.7-502(2) 
(1965). 
19. See, e.g., Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); OHIO 
REv. ConE ANN.§ 4505.04 (Page 1965). 
20. VA. ConE ANN.§§ 46.1-41 to -98 (1958). 
21. See l\kQuay v. Mount Vernon Bank & Trust Co., 200 Va. 776, 108 S.E.2d 251 
(1959). 
22. 205 Va. 934, 140 S.E.2d 667 (1965). 
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holder of a conditional sale contract who succeeded to the rights of the 
original buyer, a conditional vendee in default. Although the bill of sale 
to the original buyer was unsigned and recited an incorrect serial number, 
the Court held that under Georgia law, where the sale had been made, no 
bill of sale was essential to pass title to personalty and that other irrefutable 
evidence of identification was sufficient to overcome the incorrect serial 
number designation.23 
No Implied Warranty of Quality in Sale or Bailment of Used Car 
A prospective used car buyer was invited by the dealer to take the car 
out for a trial run with a view to inducing its sale. In the course of the 
trial run, a tire blew out, causing the car to overturn and injure the 
prospective buyer-bailee. His action to recover damages from the dealer 
was grounded on negligence and breach of implied warmnty of safety 
and suitability. The bailee failed to prove negligence to the satisfaction 
of either the trial court of the Supreme Court of Appeals.24 On the breach 
of 'varranty count, the Court noted the "almost unanimous" view that 
no warranty of quality is implied in the sale of a used automobile,25 and 
concluded that since no such warranty is implied in the case of a sale, a 
fortiori it is not to be implied on a bailment to test with a view to purchase. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Section 8-673 of the Virginia Code26 protects the title of a purchaser 
at a judicial sale unless the sale is set aside within twelve months from its 
confirmation. In Finkel Outdoor Products, Inc. v. Bei/,27 the Supreme 
Court of Appeals held that the protection does not extend as against prior 
judgment lien creditors who were not served with process and made parties 
to the suit from which the decree of sale emanated. The Court also found 
that the facts did not establish a defense of laches, and held that in any 
event the creditors were not asserting an equitable right but a legal one 
not subject to the doctrine. 
23. See also In re Lowry, 40 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1930), to the effect that an incorrect 
serial number designation is not decisive of nullity. 
24. Smith v. Mooers, 206 Va. 307, 142 S.E.2d 473 (1965). See also Emroch, Torts, 
1964-1965 Annual Survey of Va. Law, 51 VA. L. REv.-,- (1965), for discussion of the 
negligence issue. 
25. See 8 AM. ju&. 2o Automobiles § 655 (1963). \Vhile the Uniform Commercial 
Code and the Virginia version thereof do not specifically exclude the implied warranties 
<lf quality in the sale of used goods, they do provide that the warranties can be excluded 
"by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade." UNIFORM CoMMER-
CI..,I. CoDE§ 2-316(3) (c); VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-316(3)(c) (1965). 
26. VA. ConE ANN. S 8-673 (1957). 
27. 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695 (1965). 
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An agreement to subordinate one's claim to a mortgage may include 
subordination to all debts secured by the mortgage and not just the face 
amount of the mortgage recited in the agreement. In Globe Iron Con-
struction Co. v. First National Bank of Bost01z2B the Court found this to be 
the clear import of the agreement terms; it could not be explained away 
by a contrary understanding of only one of the parties. 
The voiding of a lien where the subject property has been removed from 
the county where recorded for more than one year is provided for by 
section 55-98,29 which was applied in Richmond Auto Parts, Inc. v. Forbes/30 
A running account generally constitutes but one cause of action and 
cannot be divided into separate claims so as to provide a basis for several 
actions.=n Accordingly, in Deal v. C. E. Nix & Son, bzc.32 the seller prevailed 
only by proving that his delivery of fuel oil to six separate properties 
of the buyer constituted six separate accounts.33 His default judgment for 
the amount due for fuel oil delivered to one of the properties was therefore 
held not to merge actions for the amounts due for fuel delivered to the 
other properties. 
In United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, lnc.,34 the United States 
Supreme Court held that a Virginia landlord's lien, until actually enforced 
by levy, was merely a caveat of a more perfect lien to come. And in United 
States v. Lawler,ss the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia followed 
Waddill in upholding the priority of a federal tax lien docketed prior to a 
landlord's distress warrant, writ uf attachment and execution sale, although 
the tenancy had commenced anJ the rent had become in arrears prior to 
the federal assessment. In United States v. New Rose Development Corp.,36 
the Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed its Lawler concepts. 
28. 205 Va. 841, 140 S.E.Zd 629 (1965). 
29. VA. Cone ANN. § 55-98 (1959), repealed effecth·e Jan. 1. 1966. Ya. Acts of Assem-
bly 1964, c. 219. 
30. 205 Va. 856, 140 S.E.2d 825 (1965). 
31. 1 AM.}UR. 2o Actions§ 142 (1962). 
32. 206 Va. 57, 141 S.E.2d 683 (1965). 
33. \Vhere the running of the statute of limitations is involved, and nor the splitting 
of causes of action, a seller may be urging a single account rather than separate ones in 
order to establish commencement of the statutory period at the time of last delivery. 
This was the case in Columbia Heights Section 3. Inc. v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 205 Va. 
43, 135 S.E.2d 116 (1964), discussed in Cunis, Comr.rcts & Sales, 1963-1964 Annual Sur-
'i:ey of Va. La·w, 50 VA. L. Rev. 1280, 1282 0964). 
34. 323 u.s. 353 (1945). 
35. 201 Va. 686, 112 S.£.2d 921 (1960), discussed in Curtis, Taxation, 1959-1960 An-
mtal Sur'i.•ey of Va. Law, 46 VA. L. Rt.v. 1523, 1524 0960). 
36. ~05 \·a. 697, 139 S.F..2d 64 0964). 
